The Story of John Lennon's Patek Philippe 2499

The judgment of the Civil Court of the Geneva Court of Justice.

REPUBLIC AND CANTON OF GENEVA - JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

C/29658/2018 ACJC/727/2023

FROM THE COURT OF JUSTICE - Civil Chamber - WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 2023

Fra

Mr. A ______ , domiciled ______, Hong Kong, appealing the judgment rendered by the 19th Chamber of the Court of First Instance of this canton on August 17, 2022, appearing by Mr. B______, attorney-at-law,

E

Ms. C ______ , domiciled ______, United States, defendant, represented by

Me Michèle WASSMER, attorney-at-law, rue Jargonnant 2, P.O. Box 6045, 1211 Geneva 6, in whose office she elects domicile.

IN REALITY.

A. By judgment JTPI/9502/2022of August 17, 2022, communicated to the parties by notice on August 18, 2022, the Court of First Instance dismissed A______ all of its claims (point 1 of the operative part), finding C______ to be the sole and only owner of the watch D______/1______ [make, model], Movement Number 2______, Number 3______ (ch. 2), set legal costs at 85.360 francs, offset against advances provided by the parties and placed on A______, the latter consequently ordered to pay 51,500 fr. to C______ and pay 3,660 fr. to the State of Geneva (Ch. 3), further ordered A______ to pay 67,970 fr. to C______ as costs (Ch. 4), ordered the return to C______ by the Financial Services of the Judicial Power of a bond of 67,970 francs. paid as security for costs (Ch.

In essence, the Court held that the watch in question was not the subject of an initial donation between C______ and E______, former firefighter F______, a Turkish national. In the absence of donation, the watch remained the property of its original owner under New York law. E______ had not acquired this watch by prescription under New York law. He also claimed that he had not acquired the watch by prescription under Turkish law either. He, again under Turkish law, denied that G______ had purchased the watch from E______, as he held that the latter, not being in good faith at the time of the assignment, was not entitled to this assignment, as he was not the owner of it. He also denied again under Turkish law that G______ could have acquired ownership of the watch by acquisitive prescription, since he himself did not act in good faith, having stated that he believed that the watch had not previously been lawfully acquired. He then holds, under German law, that regardless of the good or bad faith of A______, the latter could not become the rightful owner of the watch, since the watch was initially believed to be stolen, the bona fide purchaser not being protected in this case. . Moreover, the latter's bad faith had to be accepted since he claimed to be a recognized collector and specialist in luxury watches. The defendant therefore remained the sole rightful owner of the watch,

B.a. _ Against this judgment A______ appealed in a document filed at the Court Registry on September 15, 2022, citing a disputed value of francs 600,000, equivalent to the purchase price by him of the watch. He concluded that the judgment should be set aside and that it should therefore be noted that this is the one and only

watch holder D______/1______, Movement Number 2______, Number 3______ counterclaims should be declared inadmissible, subject to costs and expenses.

In essence, he complains that the Court established the facts partially inaccurately and violated the law. In summary, and as correctly understood, he complains that the Court found, on the basis of a criminal investigation carried out in Germany, that the watch had been stolen, whereas this proceeding had failed to prove and accepted as probative, in this regard, the statements of a German criminal police inspector, the content of which is disputed. It also criticizes him for favorably considering the statements of C______'s lawyer in the United States, whereas given his proximity and role they could not be. He also reproaches him for failing to recall the facts he lists on pp. 9-12 of his appellate brief that would prove that C______ had delivered the watch to E______. In addition, he denounces several false or inaccurate findings of fact that the court considered decisive.

As for the alleged violations of law challenged by the appellant to the Court, he argues, in summary, that the Court misapplied German law by failing to recognize that G______ benefited from a presumption of ownership against him by virtue of owning the watch , there being no evidence to support, according to him, that G______ would have doubted E______'s acquisition of prior possession.

Moreover, the Court erroneously did not find it necessary for C______ to rebut the presumption of ownership attached to possession of the watch or provide proof of theft, which could not be done to the extent that there was no theft . It had, therefore, to assume the consequences, which the Court should have taken note of.

She finally argues that even if there had been theft, New York law required the injured person to take action within three years of discovery. However, the date of the theft was not proven but E______ had been employed by Mr. and Mrs. C______/F______ until 2006. Since no proof was provided of the discovery of the theft she complained of in 2014, C______ was barred from contesting the claimant's ownership of the watch.

B. In a reply dated November 21, 2022, C______ concluded that the appeal should be dismissed and that all of the appellant's claims should be dismissed, subject to costs and expenses. It preliminarily concluded that the appellant's conclusion that his counterclaim was inadmissible should be declared inadmissible. Essentially, with regard to the latter point, it held that this conclusion, having not been reached at first instance, could not be reached on appeal, since the conditions for the admissibility of a new conclusion had not been met.

On the merits, he argues that the plaintiff cannot avail himself of the rebuttable presumption of ownership arising from possession for multiple reasons, and particularly because his good faith is questionable, insofar as the legitimacy of the alleged ownership of the previous possessor was not proven and where the donation of the watch to E______, which is not presumed, was not proven. In addition to the absence of donation, the theft of the watch had also been satisfactorily proven. In addition, the testimony of his lawyer had to be taken into account insofar as he had actually been a direct witness to the discovery of the theft on the date indicated. The court had thus correctly ascertained the relevant facts. It had, moreover, validly applied the law and in particular paragraphs 932, 935 and 1006 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). She had remained the sole owner of the watch; neither E______, G______, nor A______ had ever acquired ownership of it.

Finally, it indicates that the value of the case should be increased to 4,000,000 francs, the estimated value of the watch, and that the plaintiff should be required to complete the advance payment of costs, but does not draw a formal conclusion in this regard.

v. By reply dated January 5, 2023, the appellant reiterated his findings and grounds for appeal, contending that his conclusion about the inadmissibility of the respondent's counterclaim was new and per se inadmissible.

In a rejoinder dated February 8, 2023, the respondent persisted in its conclusions.

D. Following this exchange, the parties sent the Court new "spontaneous goods" in which they, once again, insisted on their conclusions.

Subsequently, the court sent the case back to trial.

C. The following relevant facts emerge for the continuation of the proceedings:

ha. During 1980, C______, widow of the late F______, a Japanese national and a resident of H______ (USA), purchased a D______ watch, model 1______, 18-carat yellow gold, movement number 2______, case number 3______, from I______ & CO at H______ (hereinafter : the watch).

C______ bore engraved on the back the words "______" in reference to the first song "______" from the album "______" that the couple composed together after a period of separation.

C______ gave this watch to the late F______ on ______ 1980 for his 40th birthday .

On ______ 1980, two months later, the late F______ was murdered outside his home in H______.

All of his assets were the subject of a nearly 1,000-page inventory compiled by J______ and bound in two volumes dated January 1982.

The introductory text of this inventory specifies that the goods were gathered in boxes and bags, sealed and numbered, the contents of which were listed in 1981.

The Watch was listed under inventory number 4______, including another gold watch and various jewelry, and was stored by the notary in a coded box.

The introductory text also specifies that a month after the inventory was drawn up, C______ wanted to retrieve the Clock that had been donated to him, this object being the only one whose removal he authorized.

Following the liquidation of the estate of the late F______, the clock became the property of C______.

C______ owns two apartments (Nos. 5______ and 6______) in the K______ building at H______, as well as an office located on the ground floor of that building.

He lives in apartment No. 6______, where there is a locked bedroom with his personal items from the estate of the deceased F______. Diaries and watches are in locked cabinets or on open shelves in this locked room. The less valuable personal effects of the deceased F______ are in the office.

Most of C______'s employees had access to the office on the ground floor. However, only two or three employees had access to the apartment, to which only C______ had keys.

B. E______, a Turkish national, was C______'s private driver from 1995 to 2006. A relationship of trust existed between them: he had access to rooms in the apartment.

During 2006, E______ threatened to reveal an alleged romantic relationship with C______ if she did not pay him money. He was later convicted in the United States of extortion, then deported to Turkey given the expiration of his visa.

versus In 2010, E______ gave the watch to a certain G______, also a Turkish national. He also gave him 86 items that belonged to the late F______.

D. In August 2013 G______ contacted the auction house L______ AG (formerly U______ AG, hereafter L______ AG) in M______ (Germany) to offer the watch for sale.

L______ AG estimated the value of the Watch at Euro 250,000.- pointing out, however, that its provenance-it had belonged to F______-as well as the engraving, promised a potentially very high value because these features made it a unique piece capable of attracting enthusiasts even outside of mere watch collectors. As a result, its value was expected to increase significantly.

On October 21, 2013, at the request of L______ AG, E______ signed before the notary of M______ a certificate that he had received the watch from C______ in November 2005, on which N______ (his wife) could attest. He specified that he had sold and delivered the watch to G______ in May 2010 in Turkey.

Subsequently, before a notary public on January 23, 2017, E______ made a statement "under oath" in which he stated that he had taken possession of the 86 items entrusted to L______ AG in 2006, with the consent of C______, claiming that he had asked to keep them safe. He then had to leave the United States and took the items with him. He clarified that at no time did C______ or anyone else ask him to return these items. He concluded that he could keep them and that he was the owner.

e. On November 14, 2013, G______ signed a supply contract with L______ AG, attesting to the delivery of the watch. The initial purchase price was estimated at EUR 240,000, and the "limit" selling price was set at EUR 400,000.

On the same day G______ signed with L______ AG a contract called Side Letter and Guarantee Agreement. Under this contract, the parties provided that in the event that C______ or a third party rights holder asserted claims, L______ AG would pay either the estimated price in the event of cancellation of the sale or the sale price less commission.

In handing over the watch to L______ AG, G______'s lawyer pointed out in a letter dated November 4, 2013, that the latter could not provide a guarantee of a property right with unrestricted right of disposition, stating that "the details are known. L______ AG and G______ then agreed, in the contract of November 14, 2013, that G______ would confirm its right of disposition based on statements made by E______ before a notary public on October 21, 2013. However, said contract expressly provided for the possibility of a claim of ownership by C______.

On November 22, 2013, L______ AG obtained a certificate from D______ regarding the authenticity of the watch.

F. In a letter of intent dated December 29, 2013 and signed on January 25, 2014, L______ AG agreed to sell the Watch for EUR 600,000.- to A______, a watch collector and long-time watch professional, describing himself as a "world authority in the field of watches," of Italian nationality and domiciled in Hong Kong.

The letter of intent states that "the sale is subject to the written acceptance of the current owner. Upon receipt of this acceptance, a formal sales contract and invoice will be prepared. The contract of sale will be signed by L______ AG and the buyer and will contain more detailed information about the transaction and the watch itself, particularly the fact that C______ has not confirmed the provenance of the watch, a fact known to all parties involved in this transaction" (Ch. 2).

"Upon completion of the sale of the watch, the buyer shall deliver his private collection of at least 40 different antique [brand] P______ watches to L______ AG for special sale to L______ AG" (Ch. 3).

"Upon completion of the sale of the watch, L______ AG will contact C______ to obtain confirmation that it has offered the watch to F______. Upon receipt of such confirmation in writing, the watch will be delivered by the buyer to L______ AG to be sold in a future watch auction with a net reserve price of EUR 800,000 and a total sales commission of 10%" (Ch. 4).

On March 2, 2014, A______ purchased the watch from L______ AG for the price of EUR 600,000.

G. On June 26, 2014, A______ turned the watch over to Q______ SA in Geneva so that its value could be assessed.

In September 2014, R______, C______'s lawyer, was informed by Q______ SA that the Clock was on his premises. By letter dated September 8, 2014, R______ informed Q______ SA that the Clock was mentioned in the inventory of the deceased F______'s property drawn up after his death and had remained in the possession of C______. The latter was not aware that the Watch was no longer in her possession until S______, an employee of Q______ at H______, contacted R______. She had told her that the Watch had been purchased from A______ by a person who had purchased it herself from E______, who claimed that C______ had given it to her. However, at no time had C______ donated this watch. This was a special item, one of the last gifts she gave to F______. Under no circumstances would he have given it to a third party. Therefore, to the extent that the watch had been stolen without C______'s knowledge, she demanded its return.

H. After taking unsuccessful steps in the United States, C______, through his Geneva lawyer, claimed ownership of the watch from A______ on October 23, 2015, claiming it had been stolen from him.

On October 16, 2015, A______ disputed all the claims made by C______ on the Watch.

On Dec. 17, 2015, the parties and Q______ SA entered into an escrow agreement under which the Watch would be delivered to Me B______, A______'s attorney, until such time as an agreement or claim to its ownership was adjudicated, Me B______ being able to dispose of the Watch "only in the hands of the owner designated by the judgment of the appropriate state court."

At the same time, E______ and G______ handed over 86 items belonging to the late F______, later stolen by E______, to L______ AG in October 2014.

me. As a result of the bankruptcy of L______ AG in 2017 in M______ and the discovery of personal items of the deceased F______, registered by G______ with her, criminal proceedings for fraud and receiving stolen property were initiated in Germany against E______ and G______.

In the course of the German proceedings C______, heard as a witness, stated that she did not give the Watch to E______. In fact, it had a special meaning for her. She clarified that after the death of the late F______, she had wanted to give something that belonged to her to those who had worked so faithfully for her. Therefore, she told E______ to take a watch. She actually owned many watches. E______ had therefore taken a watch but it was in no way the Watch offered to the late F______, the subject of the dispute. She had taken something that was not important to her.

In their "interim final report," the German investigators specified that during the investigation G______ had thought it possible that the watch was the result of theft and had accepted it. He had also tried to sell it first to a restaurateur, who put him in touch with L______ AG.

In August 2017, at the request of the Berlin police, the watch was registered in the international register of stolen property.

At the same time, negotiations were ongoing between the parties, which the A______ board closed on December 20, 2018.

On February 27, 2019, the O______ District Court in M______ found G______ guilty of receiving stolen goods and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment with a suspended sentence, noting that he had decided to hand over to L______ AG 86 items other than the deceased F______'s property obtained from E______ through a theft or embezzlement committed in C______'s apartment in H______, for the purpose of selling them at auction and after stating to L______ AG that E______ had received them as a former driver from C______ , when he knew that this did not correspond to reality.

As for E______, he was on the run. Le Parquet de M______ avait émis un mandat d'arrêt à son encontre le 20 novembre 2017. Un mandat d'arrêt EUROPOL avait, en outre, été émis à son encontre le 13 septembre 2019, notamment pour des faits relatifs au le vol de la Orologio.

D. By document filed with the Clerk of the Court on December 20, 2018, declared unconciliated and introduced on June 5, 2019, A______ brought an action seeking a declaration that he is the sole and exclusive owner of the Watch and that C______ is not the owner and has no rights to this Watch.

He explains that C______ had never reported the theft of this Watch and had never taken any action on it.

In a reply dated November 29, 2019, C______ opposed the claim and concluded, by counterclaim, that the Court considers that it is the sole and only owner of the Clock.

She claimed that the watch had been stolen from her by E______, which the criminal proceedings conducted in Germany had made it possible to prove. The latter had therefore been unable to acquire ownership of it. Likewise, G______, who could not be unaware of the origin of the Watch, could not become its owner. Consequently, A______ also could not become its owner.

Following A______'s request for bail, on May 18, 2020, the court ordered C______ to post a bond to cover expenses in the amount of 67,970 francs.

In response to the counterclaim of September 4, 2020, A______ persisted in its conclusions.

He disputed that the criminal proceedings had made it possible to establish that the watch had been stolen and claimed that C______ had given it to E______, relying in particular on the latter's statement before a notary public and C______'s statement before the police that he had admitted giving a watch to E______. Finally, he produced several documents related to the sale of identical D______ watches by Q______ SA, the price of which ranged from Fr.- 160,000 to Fr. 400,000.

In its response to the counterclaim dated December 7, 2020, C______ persisted in its conclusions, noting that the watch was exceptional in nature and had been valued between USD 2,000,000.- and USD 4,000,000. - go______.

A______, in its rejoinder to the counterclaim dated February 8, 2021, also persisted in its conclusions.

On August 16, 2021, the parties produced their documents regarding the applicable foreign law.

At the hearing on March 16, 2022, the Court heard from the witness R______, who confirmed that in 2014, he had been approached by a certain S______, head of Q______'s fine watchmaking department at H______, to inform him that an individual had shown up with the watch at Q______ SA and I wanted to know its value.

When he informed C______ that her Clock was in Geneva, she replied that the Clock must still be in her house because she had put it in a locked room. In this special room there were many items that were stored in cabinets. She checked and noticed that the clock was missing. This clock was the last gift that C______ gave to F______ before his murder.

Until contacting Q______ SA, neither he nor C______ knew that the Watch had been stolen. As soon as he learned of it, he contacted the prosecutor of H______, who told him that since the Watch was no longer in the United States, there was no point in filing criminal charges in this country.

At the final hearing of the pleadings on May 11, 2022, the parties reiterated their conclusions at the end of which the court rendered the judgment under appeal.

PLACE

1.1 An appeal is admissible if it has been lodged with the competent authority (Art. 120 para. 1 lit. a LOJ), within the time limit of 30 days and in the form prescribed by law (Art. 130 and 311 CPC), against a final decision of first instance (Art. 308 para. 1 lit. a CPC) rendered in a property case whose disputed value exceeds 10,000 francs. (Art. 91 para. 1, 94 and 308 para. 2 CPC).

The defendant's reply brief, filed in the prescribed form and time limit (Art. 312 cpc), is also admissible.

1.2 The Court examines the case with full power of examination (Art. 310 CPC), within the limits set by the maxims of discussion and disposition applicable to the present dispute (Art. 55 para. 1 and 58 para. 1 CPC). The ordinary procedure applies (Art. 243 para. 1 CPC to the contrary ).

1.3 The appellant concludes, first, that the counterclaims filed in the first instance by the respondent to establish its ownership of the Watch must be declared inadmissible insofar as it did not make findings of condemnation in restitution of the object.

Without it being necessary to rule on the admissibility of this conclusion presented for the first time on appeal, we must agree with the respondent that it makes no sense. In fact, the parties agreed in the delivery and escrow agreement of December 17, 2015 (Article 4 "Commitments of Mr. B______" (4.5)) that Mr. B______ could only "have the watch in the hands of the owner designated by the relevant state court," so a judgment of condemnation regarding restitution in the proceeding was entirely unnecessary for the enforcement of their agreement. The only conclusion that had to be drawn by the defendant in the proceeding was the one, actually drawn, aimed at establishing his ownership of the thing. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the defendant thus clearly has an interest in such a finding. We note, finally, that the appellant proceeded throughout the proceedings at first instance without ever first objecting to the inadmissibility invoked in the appeal.

1.4 As the appellant also complains that the Court potentially omitted relevant facts, the facts of this judgment are based on the relevant facts from the file submitted to the Court.

2. The dispute has many foreign elements, the plaintiff being of Italian nationality, domiciled in China, the defendant being of Japanese nationality, domiciled in the United States of America.

None of the parties disputes the jurisdiction of the Geneva judicial authority based on Article 98(2) LDIP, none of them disputes that the watch is in Geneva under the custody and escrow of Me B______.

2.1 According to Article 100 al. 1 LDIP, the acquisition and loss of movable real rights are governed by the law of the place where the movable property is located at the time of the facts on which the acquisition or loss is based.

Article 100 al. 1 LDIP deals with the situation in which the process of acquiring a moveable right in rem took place entirely in one state. It designates as the applicable law that of the place where the property is located. Ownership may be moved from one state to another, which may result in a change in the applicable law. This is referred to as the moving conflict rule in this case. It is based on a connection, the location of the thing, which can change over time. Determinant is the location of the thing at the time when the alleged right in rem was acquired, transferred or lost. Regarding the movable conflict, the generally accepted principle is to say that a validly acquired right in rem must be recognized in the new state of things at the time of a subsequent change of state (Fisch/Fisch, Basler Kommentar, 2021, nos. 5, 12, 18 to Art. 100; Dutoit, Swiss Private International Law, Commentary, 2016 nos. 3 and 4 to Art. 100; Gaillard, CR-LDIP-CL, 2011 nos. 5 to Art. 100).

The real right must be maintained in its continuity according to the rules that prevail in the place where the object is located. The movable conflict rule is limited to the examination of the acquisition or loss of the alleged right in rem (Gaillard, op.cit., nos. 9-10 to art. 100)

As for the content and exercise of real movable rights, they too fall (Art. 100 para. 2 LDIP) under the law of the place where the movable is located. Therefore, the law of the state where the new situation of the movable is located determines whether the owner of a movable can avail himself of a presumption of ownership (Art. 930 al.1 CC).

The acquisition of property by acquisitive prescription presupposes uninterrupted possession of the thing in good faith and observance of the limitation period. If the thing changes legal order before the expiration of this period, in application of the principle of lex rei sitae , the law of the new state will apply to the acquisition of ownership of the thing. (Fisch/Fisch, op. cit. no. 25 at art. 100).

According to Art. 16 para. 1 LDIP, the content of foreign law is established ex officio. This may require the cooperation of the parties. In property matters, proof may be placed on the parties (see Art. 150 para. 2 CPC).

2.2 The plaintiff complains that the Court, in essence, found, by falsely applying the rules of the American law of [the State of] New York, that the Watch had been stolen by E______ and that it had not been handed over to him by the defendant, in addition to finding, by misapplying the relevant provisions of German law, that G______ was not a bona fide possessor and that he himself could not avail himself of the presumption of bona fide possession.

Before proceeding to the analysis of these complaints, it should be noted that it is not disputed that the watch originally belonged to the late F______ and that the defendant became its sole owner upon his death, as part of his estate opened to H______.

It is also undisputed that, subsequently, the Watch came into the possession of E______, also in H______, then of G______, in Turkey (the appellant sometimes seems to question it, without getting anything out of it), and finally of the appellant, in Germany.

2.3 The plaintiff contests the Court's backward reasoning in the area of determining the applicable law in cases of conflict of movable laws, arguing, if correctly understood, that it would be to start from the premise that he is presumed to be the owner (under Swiss law?) of the watch because it is in his possession. The defendant disputes this view.

In the context of the application of the rules of movable conflicts, due to the movement of the thing from one country to another, the Court's reasoning based on the chronology of transfers to determine which law applies to which transfer, is the only one that allows it to determine whether the ultimate possessor (i.e., the plaintiff) can claim (based on the rules relating to the presumption of the fact of possession or not) ownership of the thing.

Accordingly, the Court will repeat this chronology, insofar as the complaints are concerned, so that the entry into possession by E______ and its consequences will be evaluated under the American law of [the State of] New York, the law of the place of location of the Watch at the time of the transfer, where applicable under Turkish law insofar as it relates to the possible acquisition by acquisitive prescription by E______, then in the context of the sale/delivery by E______ to G______, and finally under German law "insofar as it relates to its acquisition by the plaintiff.

3. The appellant challenges the court's finding that E______ stole the Watch from its owner and, as a corollary, that the owner did not hand it over to him, as no proof of a donation was provided.

Consideration of E______'s taking possession of the Watch falls under U.S. law in [the State of] New York, where the object is located at the time of transfer.

3.1 American law [of the states] of New York and New Jersey, relating specifically to gifts, is derived from the common law system. It is therefore based on precedent.

According to this right, substantiated by the parties and in particular by the legal opinion on the record and the rulings of the Supreme and Appellate Courts of [the State of] New York and New Jersey, principles relating to the examination of the validity of an inter vivos donation has emerged from a ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in Gruen v. Gruen 68 NY2d 48 [1986]. Such a donation is subject to the fulfillment of three cumulative conditions, namely, the donor's intention to transfer, the donee's acceptance of the donation, and the delivery of the thing in accordance with the donor's intention, conditions which, in the absence of a written document, must be proved by the person who intends to avail himself of an inter vivos donation; one who claims to have obtained the property through an inter vivos donation bears the burden of proving the fulfillment of the conditions by clear and convincing evidence (Mirvish v. Mott, 18 NY3d 510 (2012)). Proof of the donor's intention to move requires proof of his intention to impoverish himself without compensation (Fulper's Estate, 99 NJEq 293, 302 (1926)).

3.2 In the present case, in the absence of a written document attesting to a possible donation of the Watch to E______, the plaintiff considers that this fact must be substantially inferred from the statements made by the defendant herself to the German police that she gave a watch to E______ and that this watch can only be the Watch, insofar as the inventory contains no others.

This complaint can be dismissed from the outset by noting from a reading of Ch. 23 of the inventory of real property, according to the excerpt produced in the proceeding, that it includes at least one other piece of evidence than the one that is the subject of the proceeding, so that the appellant's demonstration is incorrect. For the rest, it should be remembered that it is not for the person who claims to have donated to prove that he did not do so, but for the person who claims to have received as a donation to prove the donor's intention to donate. Giving. Nothing of the sort is apparent from the record, so for this reason, too, the grievance must be dismissed.

It follows that the Clock not having been donated to E______, the latter appropriated it without right so that its possession was illegitimate ab initio . He could not acquire ownership of it, invoking no other ground for acquisition than the donation, which did not take place.

3..3 The resolution of the question of whether E______ subsequently acquired the property by acquisitive prescription, which was denied by the Court pursuant to the American law of [the State of] New York and Turkish law, not being called into question, the appellant, finding the Court's reasoning on the point irrelevant, will not return to it.

The transfer of the clock from E______ to G______ and its consequences, as assessed by the Court under Turkish law, are not questioned either, so he will not be returned there, subject to the following.

3.4 The appellant challenges the Court's finding that G______ could not be considered a bona fide purchaser or possessor under German law.

3.4.1 According to Paragraph 932 Ch. 1 BGB, with an alienation made under Paragraph 929 (i.e. by physical delivery of the thing and agreement of the parties to transfer ownership), the purchaser becomes the owner even if the thing does not belong to the alienator, unless he or she was in good faith at the time he or she acquired ownership under these provisions.

According to Section 935 Ch. 1 BGB, the acquisition of property on the basis of Subsections 932 to 934 does not occur if the thing has been stolen, lost or otherwise taken from its owner.

According to Paragraph 1006 Ch. 1 BGB, the possessor of a movable thing is presumed to be its owner.

3.4.2 In the present case, the appellant disputes the Court's reasoning, believing that he should be protected in the purchase of the watch by the fact that, on the one hand, G______ was the owner of the sold watch, and thus was presumed to be the owner vis-à-vis him, and, on the other hand, that he himself was in good faith in the purchase, "having had not the slightest reason to have any doubts about the watch's provenance."

With the defendant, we must remember that the presumption in §1006 BGB can be taken into account only on the condition that the purchaser was in good faith at the time of acquisition. However, in the present case, it appears from the record, and in particular from G______'s own statements before the M______ police, that he had doubts about the origin of the watch, but took no action to dispel them. Moreover, the fact that he attempted to sell the watch through the manager of a public establishment, as revealed in the German criminal investigation, and that he was convicted in Germany of receiving the other 86 items belonging to the deceased F______ stolen by E______ from the defendant , support this assessment.

Accordingly, the Court was correct in finding that G______ did not become the owner of the Watch due to its initial bad faith during the acquisition/entry into possession under German law.

It follows that the appellant could not avail himself of the protection of the bona fide purchaser in Paragraph 932 c. 1 BGB, insofar as it was held that the Watch had been stolen and that therefore Paragraph 935 Ch. 1 BGB excludes the protection of bona fide third parties in such cases. The appellant does not dispute this as a matter of law but contents himself with repeating over and over again that, according to him, the Watch had not been stolen, which was disproved above.

It is therefore unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the plaintiff himself was in good faith at the time of purchasing the Watch. Even his qualities, which he himself praised on his personal website, that he is a "world specialist in collectible watches," leave one to doubt this, even though he bought a watch, which he says in the proceedings "would be worth between 200,000 and 400,000 francs, for a sum of 600,000 francs, with estimates from specialized auction houses estimating its value at around 4,000,000 francs.

For all these reasons, the judgment under appeal should be affirmed.

4. The parties still disagree on the question of disputed value, the plaintiff setting it at 600,000 francs, the defendant at 4,000,000 francs.

It is not necessary to determine it more precisely in order to set the costs of the appeal procedure at 27,000 francs. to be borne by the unsuccessful appellant (Art. 106, para. 1, Code of Criminal Procedure), offset by the advance payment of costs paid that remains with the state, an amount included in the range provided by the Regulations on the Tariff of Costs for Disputes with a Disputed Value of 100,000 francs. to 10,000,000 francs. (Articles 17 and 35 RTFMC).

The plaintiff will be ordered to pay the costs of the appeal in favor of the defendant in the amount of 30,000 francs, which is reasonable taking into account the work done by the defendant's counsel, pursuant to regulatory provisions (Art. 23 LaCC; 84, 85 and 90 RTFMC ).

* * * * *

FOR THESE REASONS,

The Civil Chamber:

It has the shape:

Declares the appeal brought by A______ against the judgment JTPI/9502/2022 rendered on August 17, 2022 by theCourt of First Instance in Case C/29658/2018 admissible.

Basically : Confirms this judgment .Excludes the parties from any other conclusion.

On fees: Freezes call charges at 27,000 francs, puts them on A______ and offsets them against the advance he paid and which remains with the State of Geneva.

Orders A______ to pay C______ the sum of 30,000 francs. as appeal costs.

Sitting: Mr. Cédric-Laurent MICHEL, chairman; Mr. Laurent RIEBEN, Ms. Paola CAMPOMAGNANI, judges; Ms. Camille LESTEVEN, clerk.